PANEL 15- Revisiting the Difference Principle and its Competitors
Convenor: Paula Mateus and João Cardoso Rosas
All inquiries about the panel should be sent to [email protected].
For Rawls, the question of what is a fair distribution goes far beyond stipulating how to share income and wealth. «The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of the social system» (1971: §43). When the distribution is understood in this broad way, pursuing distributive justice becomes a task only attainable with the effort of all the principles of justice, Rawls believes. The aim is that the institutions of the basic structure of society maintain a fair, efficient, and productive system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next (Rawls: 2001: §14). In this effort, the Difference Principle is predominant because it contributes to square social and economic inequalities, prioritizing the least advantaged members of the production process. The Difference Principle mitigates the effects of social lottery and, in particular, of the natural lottery, encouraging the least advantaged to participate in social cooperation while allowing advantages that also stimulate those who benefit most from it. It is a principle of reciprocity based on the idea that social and economic arrangements are always the result of a joint effort, in which the different roles are relevant.
However, some argue that the Difference Principle is not the best instrument to ensure a fair distribution and propose alternatives. Nozick's entitlement theory, Harry Frankfurt's doctrine of sufficiency, Sen's capabilities theory, and Dworkin's proposal on the allocation of resources, Luck Egalitarianism, emerged to challenge the supremacy of the Difference Principle in the debate. And these are just a few examples of competing alternatives. There are significant differences between them: Nozick argued that we should not trust standardized redistributive principles; Frankfurt contested the priority of the least advantaged, preferring to ensure that everyone has sufficient, for instance.
In this panel, we will discuss the success of the Difference Principle and the challenges posed by competitors and critics. We intend to confront these and other proposals with the demands of ideal theory – justification, coherence, parsimony, etc. – and with empirical circumstances that favor some over others.
We welcome submissions on Rawls’ Difference Principle, on any of his followers, critics, and competitors, including the above-mentioned and many others, and also contributions on the institutional aspects of the application of the Difference Principle in real-world situations.
If you want to apply, please submit an abstract, of 400-500 words along with five keywords, of your paper prepared for peer review by 17 April 2022. We will respond by 28 April 2022. All proposals must be submitted online through our website using the Abstract submission Form (please, click “Submit Abstract” and fill the form).
All inquiries about the panel should be sent to [email protected].
For Rawls, the question of what is a fair distribution goes far beyond stipulating how to share income and wealth. «The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of the social system» (1971: §43). When the distribution is understood in this broad way, pursuing distributive justice becomes a task only attainable with the effort of all the principles of justice, Rawls believes. The aim is that the institutions of the basic structure of society maintain a fair, efficient, and productive system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next (Rawls: 2001: §14). In this effort, the Difference Principle is predominant because it contributes to square social and economic inequalities, prioritizing the least advantaged members of the production process. The Difference Principle mitigates the effects of social lottery and, in particular, of the natural lottery, encouraging the least advantaged to participate in social cooperation while allowing advantages that also stimulate those who benefit most from it. It is a principle of reciprocity based on the idea that social and economic arrangements are always the result of a joint effort, in which the different roles are relevant.
However, some argue that the Difference Principle is not the best instrument to ensure a fair distribution and propose alternatives. Nozick's entitlement theory, Harry Frankfurt's doctrine of sufficiency, Sen's capabilities theory, and Dworkin's proposal on the allocation of resources, Luck Egalitarianism, emerged to challenge the supremacy of the Difference Principle in the debate. And these are just a few examples of competing alternatives. There are significant differences between them: Nozick argued that we should not trust standardized redistributive principles; Frankfurt contested the priority of the least advantaged, preferring to ensure that everyone has sufficient, for instance.
In this panel, we will discuss the success of the Difference Principle and the challenges posed by competitors and critics. We intend to confront these and other proposals with the demands of ideal theory – justification, coherence, parsimony, etc. – and with empirical circumstances that favor some over others.
We welcome submissions on Rawls’ Difference Principle, on any of his followers, critics, and competitors, including the above-mentioned and many others, and also contributions on the institutional aspects of the application of the Difference Principle in real-world situations.
If you want to apply, please submit an abstract, of 400-500 words along with five keywords, of your paper prepared for peer review by 17 April 2022. We will respond by 28 April 2022. All proposals must be submitted online through our website using the Abstract submission Form (please, click “Submit Abstract” and fill the form).